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THE UNTENABLE SITUATION OF  
GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW 
– AGAINST QUANTITATIVE OVERLOADING,  
QUALITATIVE OVERCHARGING AND THE OVEREXPANSION 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE –*
VOLKER KREY AND OLIVER WINDGÄTTER 
 
WITH ASSISTANCE BY  
THOMAS ROGGENFELDER AND ARASH FAGHIH NASSIRI**
Introduction 
 
– Findings: Quantitative Overloading, Qualitative Overcharging 
and the Overexpansion of Criminal Justice in Germany – 
There is a well established fact that the German criminal trial 
courts are unacceptably and unreasonably overloaded. The Ger-
man Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
BVerfG) and the Federal Supreme Court of Justice (Bundesge-
richtshof, BGH) frankly admit this fact.1
                                      
*  This article is in its core the translation of the authors’ manuscript, pub-
lished in Festschrift for Hans Achenbach, University of Osnabrück (Octo-
ber 2011, p. 233 et seq.). 
 Even those legal scholars 
**  Dr. Volker Krey, Full Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Trier, 
also judge at the Court of Appeals Koblenz (1978-1998). Email: 
kreyv@uni-trier.de. Oliver Windgätter, senior researcher and assistant lec-
turer, member of the staff of Prof. Dr. Gerhard Robbers’ chair, University of 
Trier. Email: o.windgaetter@gmx.de. 
 – Thomas Roggenfelder, Attorney at Law and Ph.D. student, Trier; Arash 
Faghih Nassiri, law student at Trier University, also member of the staff of 
Prof. Dr. Gerhard Robbers’ chair. – 
1  See BGH St 50, 40, 53, 54 (GS, i.e. Joint Panel in criminal cases); BVerfG 
(1. Kammer des Zweiten Senats, i.e. 1st Chamber [three justices] of the 
Second Senate [panel consisting of eight justices]), 2 BvR 1610/03; 
BVerfG (3rd Chamber of the Second Senate), in Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift (NJW, i.e. a German law journal) 2006, 668, 670. For legal 
literature see inter alia: Krey, German Criminal Procedure Law, Volume 1, 
2009, side note 66; Krey, Deutsches Strafverfahrensrecht, Volume 2, 
2007, side notes 1040, 1069; Kudlich, Erfordert das Beschleunigungsge-
Volker Krey and Oliver Windgätter 
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being critical towards trial courts emphasize such overloading.2 It 
is being aggravated in the context of austerity measures which 
seem to be based on a system that can briefly be described as fol-
lows: In principle, the BGH is not (if ever slightly) affected, the 
State Courts of Appeals (Oberlandesgerichte, OLG) not in an ex-
tensive manner. In contrast, the trial courts fare differently: The 
Higher District Courts (Landgerichte, LG) typically are severely af-
fected by such austerity measures, the Lower District Courts 
(Amtsgerichte, AG) brutally. Pursuant to the authors’ view, this 
practice demonstrates an evident disregard for the trial courts. 
However, their speedy as well as convincing settlement of criminal 
cases is of utmost importance for the law in action, furthermore a 
constitutive element of criminal proceedings under the rule of law. 
Hence, the guarantee of an effective criminal justice (Gewähr-
leistung einer effektiven Strafrechtspflege) is rightly recognized as 
a fundamental element of the rule of law.3
Regarding the qualitative overcharging, a preliminary reference to 
the following two legal institutions shall be sufficient here:  
 
Firstly, the so called Adhäsionsverfahren4 which has recently been 
overexpanded by statute law.5
                                                                                                          
bot eine Umgestaltung des Strafverfahrens?, Gutachten zum 68. Deut-
schen Juristentag, 2010, inter alia C 19. 
  
2  See inter alia Kühne, Juristenzeitung (JZ, i.e. a German law journal) 2010, 
821, 822, 828 (partially following Kudlich, supra note 1); also Hettinger, JZ 
2011, 292, 293, 296. 
3  BGH St 38, 214, 220; BGH, in JZ 2005, 1010, 1012 (with remarks by 
Dutge); BVerfG E 33, 367, 383; E 34, 238, 248 et seq.; E 74, 257, 262; 
BVerfG, in NJW 2002, 51, 52; BVerfG, in Strafverteidiger (StV, i.e. a Ger-
man law journal) 2009, 673; Beulke, Strafprozessrecht, 11th ed. 2010, 
side note 3; Hellmann, Strafprozessrecht, 2nd ed. 2006, side note 5; Krey, 
German Criminal Procedure Law (supra note 1), side note 16; Krey, Deut-
sches Strafverfahrensrecht, Volume 1, 2006, side notes 478 et seq.; Lan-
dau, Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (NStZ, i.e. a German law journal) 2007, 
121 et seq.; Meyer-Goßner, StPO (i.e. a commentary on the German 
Criminal Procedure Code), 54th ed. 2011, Einl. side note 18. Dissenting in-
ter alia: Hassemer, StV 1982, 275 et seq., 279 et seq.; Kühne (supra 
note 2), 822, 823; also critical Roxin/Schünemann, Strafverfahrensrecht, 
26th ed. 2009, 1/7. 
4  Proceedings in which claims for damages resulting from crimes are de-
cided within the criminal procedure by criminal trial courts instead of by 
civil courts. 
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Secondly, the so called Richtervorbehalt in State police laws, 
meaning the requirement of a court order in case of police interfe-
rence with civil rights in order to avert dangers (in contrast to inter-
ference with civil rights when prosecuting criminal offences). De-
spite police law being a part of administrative law with its own ad-
ministrative courts, criminal trial courts are burdened with deciding 
these matters.6
The overexpansion of German criminal justice results from the 
disproportional overstretching of substantive criminal law: Regard-
ing the law in action in Germany, there is a permanent extension 
of criminal law by the federal legislator enacting new criminal sta-
tutes.
 
7
                                                                                                          
5  Lastly by the federal Opferrechtsreformgesetz, dated 24 June 2004, 
Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl., i.e. German Federal Law Gazette), I, p. 1354. 
Thereto in detail and very critical: Krey/Wilhelmi, Ausbau des Adhäsions-
verfahrens: Holzweg oder Königsweg? Kritische Analyse mit rechtshistori-
schen und rechtsvergleichenden Hinweisen, in: Festschrift for Harro Otto 
2007, 933-953 with further references. 
 This development contradicts the ultima ratio-nature of 
criminal law, being an important element of the rule of law. 
6  See infra, Part Two. 
7  Convincing inter alia Kühne (supra note 2), 822, 828, here following Kud-
lich (supra note 1). Furthermore, the criminal procedure law becomes 
more and more complex due to the permanent flood of statutes re-
forming/amending the criminal procedure code. With regard to those 
erroneous developments, see infra, Part Three.  
Volker Krey and Oliver Windgätter 
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PART ONE: The Quantitative Overloading 
I.  Permanent Exceedance of the so called “Pensenschlüssel”8; 
Concealment of the Trial Courts’ Serious Overload by the  
Justice Ministries of the 16 German States Replacing the 
“Pensenschlüssel” by Enacting “PEBB§Y”9
The Pensenschlüssel, which was used for decades (until 2005) as 
scale for determining the civil and criminal judges’ workload, dem-
onstrated a permanent and significant overstretching of criminal 
justice at the Higher and Lower District Courts for a very long time. 
Such overloading amounted up to 40 % (or even more) at the 
Lower District Courts in criminal cases; the Higher District Courts’ 
overload was significant as well, however typically less, compared 
to the Lower District Courts. 
  
Thus, it proved to be a good idea from the German State Justice 
Ministries’ point of view to replace the Pensenschlüssel, since it 
illustrated the criminal trial courts’ serious overloading all too ob-
viously. This replacement was carried out by enacting PEBB§Y in 
2005, resulting in a calculational cover-up of the respective over-
load. However, the trial judges concerned easily saw through this 
ploy and criticized it a lot. By the way, in the meantime even 
PEBB§Y proves an overloading of the trial courts, albeit less evi-
dently. 
II.  Typical Causes for the Trial Courts’ Overloading 
1.  Insufficient Budgets for Courts and Judges; Austerity  
Measures in this Area Typically Affecting Trial Courts for the 
Worst 
There is a well established fact that German criminal trial courts 
have been personally and materially under-equipped for decades. 
                                      
8  See the following text. 
9  PEBB§Y (Personal-bedarfs-berechnungs-system, i.e. a calculation system 
on the judges’ workload) enacted in 2005. See PEBB§Y – Leitfaden für 
Gerichte und Staatsanwaltschaften, Baden-Württemberg, Justizminis-
terium: http://www.bdr-online.de/base/bin/download.php?ID=228 and 
additionally the explanation on Wikipedia: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
PEBB%C2%A7Y. 
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This is particularly true for established judge positions and the 
equipment of registries and offices. Furthermore, the inventory of 
the Lower and Higher District Courts’ libraries is for the most part 
wanting. In the final analysis, this results from the fact that the Jus-
tice Ministries typically are among the politically weakest ministries 
of the 16 German States. 
– This political weakness became highly obvious in attempts by 
some of the German States to merge the respective Ministry of 
Justice with the Ministry of the Interior or to incorporate the former 
into the State Chancellery of the State’s prime minister. Fortunate-
ly, such attempts failed since they were highly dubious from a 
constitutional standpoint.10
The poor equipment of the German trial courts, at least concerning 
the criminal courts, as well as the additional circumstance that the 
justice budgets of the German States are only a very marginal part 
of the States’ budgets, ought to lead to the following self-evident 
insight: Austerity measures in the Justice Ministries’ field of re-
sponsibility must not concern the criminal trial courts (at least not 
considerably). However, regarding States’ budgetary policies, 
there is a strange lack of this insight. 
 – 
                                      
10  Regarding the former, merging both the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry 
of Interior (State of North Rhine-Westphalia, NRW), see: Verfassungs-
gerichtshof NRW (i.e. State Constitutional Court) JZ 1999, 1243, 1247; 
Krey, The Public Prosecution’s Role in Criminal Proceedings under the 
Rule of Law. Legal Situation in Germany with Comparative Law Remarks 
on UK and USA, in: Rechtspolitisches Forum (Legal Policy Forum), 
Vol. 46, Institut für Rechtspolitik an der Universität Trier (Ed.), 2009, p. 19, 
20; Oppong, Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (ZRP, i.e. a German law journal) 
2009, 22, 23. Regarding the latter, incorporation into the State Chancellery 
(among others Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania) see: Oppong, 23; Rog-
genfelder, Staatsanwalt und Richter als Wächter des Gesetzes gegenüber 
der Polizei im strafprozessualen Ermittlungsverfahren, Kapitel 1, § 2, II, III, 
upcoming Ph.D. thesis, Trier University. 
Volker Krey and Oliver Windgätter 
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2. Permanent Stress Caused by Specific Features of German 
Criminal Procedure Law  
– Short-time Deadlines for the Completion of Written Judgments 
(§ 275 StPO11
a) Based on the constitutional principles of speedy trial and con-
centration of the main hearing, as well as on the principle of 
immediacy for evidence-taking, § 275 of the German Criminal 
Procedure Code (StPO)
); Strict Time Limit for Pre-trial Custody Exceeding a 
Period of Six Months (§§ 121, 122 StPO) – 
12 sets strict time limits for the completion 
of written judgments13
Exceeding these deadlines causes a so called “absoluter Re-
visionsgrund”, i.e. a fundamental error the claiming of which auto-
matically results in a successful appeal on law (§ 338 no. 7 
StPO)
. 
14. Thus, §§ 275, 338 no. 7 StPO form an effective instru-
ment for keeping the trial court judges “on their toes”. The same 
holds for the “mercilessly” strict case law on § 275 StPO by the 
German final appeal courts (Federal Supreme Court of Justice, 
State Courts of Appeals).15
In view of large-scale criminal cases, the authors would appreciate 
the following change in case law respectively in statute law with 
the intention to reasonably reduce the overloading of criminal trial 
courts: 
  
                                      
11  Strafprozessordnung (StPO), i.e. the German Criminal Procedure Code. 
12  Concerning the text of § 275 subs. 1 StPO, see the Appendix of this pub-
lication (Relevant Provisions). 
13  As to the mentioned principles as basis for § 275 StPO see inter alia: Krey, 
German Criminal Procedure Law (supra note 1), side note 66; Krey, 
Deutsches Strafverfahrensrecht, Volume 1 (supra note 3), side note 66, 
466; Krey, Deutsches Strafverfahrensrecht, Volume 2 (supra note 1), side 
note 1160; Kühne in: Löwe-Rosenberg (LR, i.e. a commentary on the 
German StPO [supra note 11]), 26th ed., Volume 1, 2006, Einl. Abschn. I, 
side note 67. 
14  Concerning the text of this provision, see the Appendix of this publication 
(Relevant Provisions). 
15  Krey (supra note 13). 
 – Regarding the German system of criminal trial courts and appellate in-
stances see diagrams 1 and 2 in: Krey, German Criminal Procedure Law 
(supra note 1), side note 69, 70. – 
The Untenable Situation of German Criminal Law 
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Firstly, when deciding whether or not there is a violation of the 
mentioned deadlines pursuant to § 275 subs. 1 s. 4 StPO, the 
German final appeal courts ought to be more understanding of the 
trial judges by way of a more generous application of the aforesaid 
rule, since the latter allows to exceed the time limit due to an “un-
avoidable and unforeseeable circumstance”.16 This holds particu-
larly if the judge who has to complete the written judgment suffers 
from a protracted illness.17
Secondly, the legislator ought to reasonably and adequately ex-
tend the time limits under § 275 subs. 1 s. 2 StPO (statutory ex-
ception enacting extensions of deadlines due to the main trial’s 
duration). 
 
Both demands are based on the following reasons: 
–  More time to complete the written judgment at hand allows for 
its higher quality. This quality is a considerable requirement 
for public acceptance of the court’s decision. Moreover, it re-
duces the risk of a successful appeal based on insufficient 
reasoning as ground of appeal. To clarify the latter: The as-
signment of error concerning substantive criminal law is suc-
cessful where the judgment’s reasoning is evidently incom-
plete since there is no sufficient fact-finding, no sufficient ex-
planation of the evidence-taking, and/or no plausible weighing 
of the evidence.18
–  In general, German criminal trial courts deal with many cases 
simultaneously. Therefore, the judges who are obliged to 
complete the written judgment within the statutory deadline 
(§ 275 StPO), usually have to write several judgments at the 
same time. Unfortunately, final appeal courts’ decisions on 
 
                                      
16  Concerning the text of this rule, see the Appendix of the publication at 
hand (Relevant Provisions). 
17  Regarding the respective case law see (with further references): Engel-
hardt in: Karlsruher Kommentar (KK, i.e. a commentary on the German 
StPO), 5th ed., 2003, § 275 side note 49; Julius in: Heidelberger Kommen-
tar (i.e. a commentary on the German StPO, edited by Julius/Gercke/Zöller 
and others), StPO, 4th ed., 2009, § 275 side note 6; Meyer-Goßner (supra 
note 3), § 275 side note 13, 15. 
18  See: Krey, Deutsches Strafverfahrensrecht, Volume 2 (supra note 1), side 
note 1148-1150, 1246; Meyer-Goßner (supra note 3), § 267 side note  
42-44 with references to case law. 
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§ 275 StPO do not always give the impression that those trivi-
al insights have been taken into deeper consideration. 
–  Legal scholars on comparative criminal law know that Germa-
ny is, so to say, “European Champion” in writing voluminous 
criminal judgments. In large scale trials written judgments may 
come up to 100 pages, sometimes even many more. Such of-
tentimes grotesque extensiveness is primarily based on dis-
proportionate as well as unreasonable demands on the writ-
ten judgment under § 267 StPO by the final appeal courts.19
b) Under § 121 StPO, pre-trial custody for one and the same of-
fence exceeding a period of six months shall not be executed. A 
statutory exception to this deadline is only given where “the partic-
ular difficulty or the unusual extent of the investigation or some 
other important reason do not yet admit pronouncement of 
judgment and justify continuation of pre-trial custody” (§ 121 
subs. 1 StPO). Per se, this strict rule is acceptable in light of the 
constitutional principle of a speedy trial, which is also guaranteed 
by Art. 6 subs. 1 s. 1 European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).
 
However, the authors frankly concede that trial judges some-
times complete the written judgment in an unnecessarily ex-
tensive manner for an exaggerated fear of the final appeal 
courts. Occasionally, though, professional incompetence may 
be the reason for disproportionately extensive written judg-
ments, since short and concise judgments are typically more 
difficult to write down than circumlocutory ones. 
20
                                      
19  This holds particularly for the BGH-requirements on the judgment’s expla-
nations concerning the defendant’s personal data like parents, child-
hood, debt, criminal record, etc. although not at all expressively required 
by statute law (§ 267 StPO – see Krey [supra note 1], Deutsches Strafver-
fahrensrecht, Volume 2, side note 1148), furthermore for the BGH-
requirements concerning the explanation of evidence taking and weigh-
ing of the evidence as well as the sentencing. 
 Nevertheless, the authors call on the State Courts of 
Appeals (Oberlandesgerichte) as well as the Federal Constitution-
20  Thereto: Krey, The Rule of Law in German Criminal Proceedings. German 
Constitutional Law and the European Convention on Human Rights, in: 
Rechtspolitisches Forum (Legal Policy Forum), Volume 43, Institut für 
Rechtspolitik an der Universität Trier (Ed.), 2008, p. 12-14. Concerning the 
text of the aforesaid provision see Appendix of this publication (Relevant 
Provisions). 
The Untenable Situation of German Criminal Law 
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al Court (BVerfG) to consider the following aspects more ade-
quately/reasonably when interpreting the mentioned legal ele-
ments (“particular difficulty or the unusual extent of the investiga-
tion or some other important reason”) of § 121 subs. 1 StPO21
Firstly, the State Courts of Appeals in many cases apparently do 
not take into deeper consideration that the numerous criminal trials 
against foreigners usually last significantly longer than other crim-
inal trials. This excessive duration results inter alia from the follow-
ing circumstances: 
; this 
is for the following reasons: 
–  in such trials, confessions are rather rare; 
–  the constant need for translation is very time-consuming;  
–  very often, it is hard to make foreign witnesses „come straight 
to the point“ during their hearing since in many parts of the 
world, the willingness to simply answer „yes“ or „no“ instead of 
answering in an unnecessarily circumlocutory manner or 
even beside the point is less common. 
Therefore, criminal proceedings against foreign defendants typi-
cally last not only about twice as long as otherwise, but are even 
more time-consuming. 
Secondly, the authors would like to recall the aforesaid common-
place that the trial judges have to deal with several criminal cases 
at the same time. Regarding the Higher District Courts (Land-
gerichte), in most of such simultaneous trials the accused is under 
remand. 
Thirdly, defense counsels not residing in the court’s district may 
cause loss of time and thus delay the proceedings, particularly in 
case of significant distance between their offices and the court.22
                                      
21  Regarding the competence of the Oberlandesgericht for prolonging the 
mentioned six month-deadline under § 121 subs. 1 StPO, see § 122 StPO. 
Concerning the constitutional complaint before the BVerfG alleging that 
the respective Oberlandesgericht has violated constitutional rights of the 
arrested, see Art. 93 subs. 1 no. 4 a Grundgesetz (GG, i.e. the German 
Federal Constitution); thereto Krey (supra note 20), p. 10, 11. As to the 
text of the mentioned provisions see Appendix of this publication (Rele-
vant Provisions).  
 
22  Setting down days for trial by the presiding judge as well as speedy fulfill-
ment of the defense counsel’s functions under §§ 147, 148, 168 c StPO 
are made more difficult in case of significant distance between the defense 
Volker Krey and Oliver Windgätter 
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Fourthly, by now, it should be known even to the State Courts of 
Appeals and the Federal Constitutional Court to what extent many 
defense counsels are prepared to severely obstruct the criminal 
trial’s progress, which shall be explained hereafter.23
3. Typical Obstacles to the Speedy Progress of the Main Trial 
 
A few aspects, some of which have been referred to already, shall 
be sufficient here. They allow for the following statement: In too 
many cases, the accomplishment of the main trial in criminal cas-
es within adequate time (principle of speedy trial) is unreasonably 
made harder for the trial judges. This fact has led to the well-
known advance of the informal arrangements (Absprachen) in 
German criminal proceedings.24
a) Delaying the Criminal Proceedings by Defense Counsels 
 
Firstly: Motions for Challenge of a Judge as Means to Delay the 
Proceedings 
 
Among German trial judges and public prosecutors there is a 
widespread opinion that the legal concept of challenging judges for 
fear of bias was extensively abused: In too many cases, such mo-
tions by the defendant (more precisely: in his name by his defense 
counsel) were filed with the intention to delay the proceedings or 
with other “intentions irrelevant to the proceedings”.25 Even though 
there may not be sufficient empirical proof for this criticism26
                                                                                                          
counsel’s office and the seat of the court – not to mention the increasing 
costs of the proceeding.  
, it is 
exceptionally true-to-life. In fact, there are many “black sheep” 
among defense counsels, whose behaviour in criminal proceed-
23  Such defense counsels in Germany are frequently characterized as Kon-
fliktverteidiger. 
24  Supplementary see infra: Part One, III., 4. 
25  Thereto e.g.: Dierlamm, Ausschließung und Ablehnung von Tatrichtern 
nach Zurückverweisung durch das Revisionsgericht, 1993, side note 6 et 
seq.; Krey, German Criminal Procedure Law (supra note 1), side note 107, 
122, 123. 
26  Insofar correct: Kühne, Strafprozessrecht, 8th. ed. 2010, side note 732. – 
Nevertheless: Dierlamm (supra note 25) and the authors, cited by Dier-
lamm in footnotes 6-15, illustrate the mentioned abuse convincingly. 
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ings may justify such reproval. § 26 a subs. 1 no. 3 StPO, which 
allows to dismiss motions of challenge as inadmissible, has been 
enacted due to the mentioned abuse.27
Secondly: Motions to Take Evidence as Additional Means to  
Delay the Proceedings 
 
 
There is a well established fact that motions to take evidence may 
be effective instruments to delay the criminal proceedings.28 The 
legislator has recognized this risk of abuse as well and thus 
enacted a statutory ground for rejecting such motions “if they are 
made to protract the proceedings” (§ 244 subs. 3 s. 2 StPO)29. 
However, the case law established by the final appeal courts has 
mitigated this instrument to a large extent by imposing exception-
ally strict requirements for its application.30
The following spectacular and highly controversial decisions by the 
German Federal Supreme Court of Justice (BGH) may illustrate to 
what extent some defense counsels and defendants are prepared 
to sabotage criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the presentation 
of those decisions shall demonstrate new legal instruments 
enacted by the Court to fight such sabotage. 
 
(a)  Judgment Dated 07 November 1991 
The Große Strafkammer des LG (i.e. a panel consisting of two, 
respectively three, professional judges and two lay judges at the 
                                      
27  Unfortunately, this provision is not of great relevance in courts’ practice, 
since it is very difficult for the trial judges to substantiate the legal require-
ments of the mentioned provision in a way not being subject to a success-
ful appeal on law. Thereto: Krey (supra note 25) side note 122 with further 
references. 
28  See: BGH, Urteil (judgment), dated 07.11.1991; Beschluss (ruling), dated 
14.06.2005 and 23.09.2008 (thereto the following text of this paper, below, 
(a) to (c) with further references); Krey, Deutsches Strafverfahrensrecht 
(supra note 1) side note 1081, 1082 with further references to the BGH’s 
case law. 
29  As to the mentioned provision’s text, see the Appendix of this publication 
(Relevant Provisions). 
30  Thereto with references to case law: Herdegen in: KK (supra note 17), 
§ 244 side note 86 et seq.; Krey (supra note 28); Meyer-Goßner (supra 
note 3), § 244 side note 67 et seq. 
Volker Krey and Oliver Windgätter 
16 
Higher District Court) had examined and subsequently rejected 
106 motions to take evidence by the defendant. After a detailed 
analysis of those motions, the court decided on 18 May 1990: 
An assessment of the motions in their entirety regarding content, 
character and sequence illustrates that the defendant’s sole inten-
tion was to sabotage the proceedings. Therefore he was barred 
from filing such motions in person. From now on, he was only al-
lowed to file motions to take evidence through his defense coun-
sel. 
The BGH has approved this decision.31 Despite widespread criti-
cism by legal scholars32
The prohibition of abuse of rights (convincingly emphasized by 
the Court), the principle of speedy trial as well as the German 
principle that carrying out criminal proceedings by the court must 
not depend on arbitrariness of the defendant and/or his coun-
sel, are good reasons for the Higher District Court’s decision. 
, the authors agree with the Court’s stand-
point; this may be explained as follows:  
 
This legal point of view may also be based on the already men-
tioned principle of ensuring an effective criminal justice33
(1) The opposing view among legal scholars results in intolerable 
consequences and thus disregards the argumentum ad absurdum 
(an unwritten, but important aspect of legal interpretation). 
, moreo-
ver on the following additional arguments: 
(2) The widespread reasoning that the prohibition of abuse of 
rights was an alien element to German criminal proceedings and 
never could restrict procedural rights of defendants and their 
counsels, is not convincing. Rather, such reasoning is solely a pe-
titio principii (begging the question) being contrary to the principle 
of uniformity of the legal system.34
                                      
31  BGH St 38, 111. 
 
32  See inter alia: Beulke (supra note 3), side note 150 with footnote 16 with 
further references; Kühne, JZ 2010, 821, 826 et seq. Consenting with the 
BGH inter alia: Hellmann (supra note 3), side notes 773, 774; Krey, 
Deutsches Strafverfahrensrecht (supra note 3), side notes 480, 481; Krey, 
Deutsches Strafverfahrensrecht (supra note 1), side notes 1066, 1067 with 
further references; Meyer-Goßner (supra note 3), § 244 side note 69 a 
with further references pro and contra. 
33  Concerning this principle, see supra: Introduction with footnote 3. 
34  Opposing the recourse to the prohibition of abusing rights as basis for 
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(3) Finally, some legal scholars argue that the Court has decided 
contra legem. This view is mistaken: The respective motions to 
take evidence could be rejected as inadmissible pursuant to 
§ 244 subs. 3 s. 1 StPO35
(b)  Ruling Dated 14 June 2005 
 without violating the law, because they 
evidently were never meant to establish the truth. 
The criminal proceedings at the Higher District Court had ended 
after three and a half years on the 291st day of the main hearing. 
During this absurdly long trial, the defense counsel’s tactics in its 
entirety was abusing the law, particularly by means of: 
–  successively filing a total of 320 motions to take evidence 
without any discernable legitimate interest; 
–  answering the court’s rejections of these motions by volumin-
ous motions for reconsideration (Gegenvorstellung) and by 
mostly inadmissible motions for challenge36
–  announcing numerous further motions to take evidence. 
; 
In reaction to such tactics, the Higher District Court had stated in 
its rulings dated 28 November and 05 December 2002 as well as 
07 January 2003: 
The Court was not willing to decide on motions to take evidence 
filed after 09 January 2003, noon. Only Hilfsbeweisanträge37
                                                                                                          
restricting defendant’s and defense counsel’s rights inter alia: Kühne  
(supra note 32), 826, 827 with further references; Roxin/Schünemann  
(supra note 3), 19/13. However, allowing such recourse: The Supreme 
Court’s practice (see supra note 28) and the leading opinion among legal 
scholars, see inter alia: Beulke (supra note 3), side note 126 a; Krey, 
German Criminal Procedure Law (supra note 1), side note 26; Krey, 
Deutsches Strafverfahrensrecht Vol. 1 (supra note 3), side notes 233, 480, 
481 with further references; Krey, Deutsches Strafverfahrensrecht Vo-
lume 2 (supra note 1), side notes 1010, 1066 et seq., 1070, 1242 with fur-
ther references; Kudlich (supra note 1), C 89, 90; Meyer-Goßner (supra 
note 3), Einl. side note 111 with further references. 
 
35  Concerning the text of this provision, see the Appendix of this publication 
(Relevant Provisions). 
36  As to such motions see supra (Part One, II., 3., a, Firstly). 
37  Hilfsbeweisantrag is a motion to take evidence, only filed e.g. for the even-
tuality of the defendant’s conviction. Thereto inter alia: Meyer-Goßner  
(supra note 3), § 244 side note 22, 22 a; Julius (supra note 17), § 244 side 
note 19, 58. 
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(which are to be decided by the court not until the written judg-
ment’s reasoning) were exempted. § 244 subs. 2 StPO38
In light of the case’s characteristic features, the BGH accepted the 
trial court’s proceeding for the following reasons: 
 remained 
unaffected.  
–  prohibition of abuse of rights; 
–  principle of speedy trial; 
–  principle of ensuring an effective criminal justice.39
In this context, the Court has summed up his standpoint in the fol-
lowing Leitsatz (headnote): 
 
Where a main hearing was delayed to an extreme extent, namely 
by motions to take evidence intended to protract the proceedings, 
the following procedural measure to fight such abuse may be tak-
en into consideration: Setting a deadline after which motions to 
take evidence will no longer be decided each by a separate court 
ruling, but only later on in the written judgment’s reasoning. 
The authors agree with this legal standpoint, since the – at times 
excessive – criticism among legal scholars is mistaken for the 
same reasons as given supra (a).40
(c)  Ruling Dated 23 September 2008 
 
Under § 246 subs. 1 StPO, a motion to take evidence may not be 
refused solely on the grounds “that the evidence or the fact which 
is to be proven was submitted too late”. This provision often 
serves defense counsels as animation for delaying the proceed-
ings by filing such motions after the taking of evidence has been 
concluded. According to case law and the prevailing scholarly opi-
                                      
38  This provision reads: „In order to establish the truth, the court shall, proprio 
motu, extend the taking of evidence to all facts and means of proof rele-
vant to the decision.” 
39  BGH JZ 2005, 1010 et seq. (with critical remarks by Duttge) = NJW 2005, 
2466 et seq. 
40  Accepting the Court’s statement e.g.: Krey, Deutsches Strafverfahrens-
recht, Volume 1 (supra note 3), side note 480, 481; Krey, Deutsches 
Strafverfahrensrecht, Volume 2 (supra note 1), side note 1068, 1069; for 
further references see: Meyer-Goßner (supra note 3), § 244 side note 69 
b. However dissenting the prevailing opinion among legal scholars, see 
inter alia: Beulke (supra note 3), side note 452 with further references; 
Duttge, JZ 2005, 1012 et seq.; apparently also Meyer-Goßner (supra). 
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nion, these belated motions may be filed until the beginning of the 
pronouncement of judgment.41 In order to fight cases of intolerable 
misuse of the mentioned possibility to sabotage the proceedings, 
the BGH has permitted the trial courts to proceed as follows:42
Because of the presiding judge’s right and obligation to conduct 
the hearing, he was authorized to set a deadline for motions to 
take evidence filed by the parties of the proceedings (particularly 
the defendant and his counsel). This authorization was not op-
posed to the aforesaid § 246 subs. 1 StPO. 
 
In case of filing motions to take evidence after the set deadline, 
this violation of limit might be a serious indication for the intention 
to delay the proceedings, unless the applicant gave plausible and 
substantiated reasons for his motion’s delay. However, where the 
respective evidence taking was required by § 244 subs. 2 StPO 
(Aufklärungspflicht des Richters, i.e. the duty of judicial inquiry)43
This third decision of the BGH is subject to very heavy criticism 
among legal scholars
, 
such indication was inapplicable. 
44, but accepted as constitutional by the 
German Constitutional Court (BVerfG, chamber ruling)45
The authors tend towards consenting to the BGH ruling and there-
by to the BVerfG chamber ruling as well, this for the following rea-
sons: 
: The lat-
ter has neither found an unconstitutional interference with constitu-
tional rights of the defendant and/or his counsel nor reproved that 
the BGH had decided contra legem by disregarding § 246 subs. 1 
StPO. 
(1) In doing so, one should not simply make recourse to § 31 
subs. 1 Federal Constitutional Court’s Act (BVerfGG). Indeed, this 
provision sets down a binding force (in the sense of stare decisis) 
of the BVerfG’s decisions for all other courts. However, such bind-
ing force holds (predominantly) for judgments of the Court’s 
                                      
41  Thereto: Meyer-Goßner (supra note 3), § 244 side note 33, § 246 side 
note 1, each with further references. 
42  BGH St 52, 355 = JZ 2009, 316 et seq. (with critical remarks by Eidam). 
43  See supra note 38. 
44  Inter alia: Beulke (supra note 40); Kühne (supra note 2), 826 (left column); 
also critical Meyer-Goßner (supra note 40) with further references. 
45  BVerfG NJW 2010, 592 (concerning the difference between Senates and 
their chambers, see supra note 1). 
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Senates, not for their chambers since the First and Second Se-
nate of the BVerfG and not their chambers are entrusted with the 
genuine development of constitutional law. Whether or not even 
chamber rulings generally have binding force under § 31 subs. 1 
BVerfGG is in dispute46; yet this question can be set aside here. 
For at least in case of such chamber rulings only decreeing the 
non-acceptance of a constitutional complaint, the respective bind-
ing force would be inadequate because no unsettled issues of 
constitutional law are being decided47
Therefore, other reasons than the simple recourse to the binding 
force of BVerfG’s decisions are necessary, if one wants to follow 
BGH and BVerfG despite the criticism among legal scholars. 
. 
(2) These reasons are largely those which the authors have al-
ready made recourse to while discussing the above-mentioned 
first and second decision of the BGH, supra, (a) and (b).  
Summing up, the Court has not disregarded § 246 StPO; rather, it 
has solely reduced the possibility to delay the proceedings by de-
fendant’s and/or his counsel’s abuse of this rule. More precisely: 
The BGH has not decided contra legem, but only carried out a so 
called teleogische Reduktion (i.e. a limitation pursuing to sense 
and purpose of the law) of the statute’s scope of application. 
b)  Problems for Presiding Judges in Setting Down Days for the 
Hearing 
An additional fact oftentimes causing difficulties for the speedy ac-
complishment of the proceedings, particularly in case of large 
scale trials, concerns the setting down days for the main trial, the 
number of which is estimated by the presiding judge. The same 
holds for setting down days for continuing the hearing (Fort-
setzungstermine) when the trial lasts longer than initially expected 
– which happens quite frequently. Nowadays, Germany ironically 
is being characterized as “leisure park” and the typical German as 
“world champion in travelling.” This, in its core correct, diagnosis 
                                      
46  Thereto: Umbach/Clemens/Dollinger (eds.), BVerfGG, 2nd ed. 2005, § 31 
side note 55 with further references; lately BGH, ruling dated 18 February 
2010, case no. 4 ARs 16/09. 
47  Umbach/Clemens/Dollinger, supra note 46. 
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results in negative consequences for setting down hearing days, 
especially days for continuing the hearing:  
Here, cases of absence due to already booked vacation of  
–  the respective judges and lay judges, 
–  defense counsels, 
–  experts like coroners,  
–  essential witnesses, etc. 
are to be taken into consideration.  
In this context, the statutory limitation for cases of the hearing’s 
interruption has to be observed as well: Under § 229 subs. 1 
StPO, a main hearing may be interrupted only for a period of up to 
three weeks.48
The presiding judge’s setting down days for the hearing is addi-
tionally aggravated by the fact that defense counsels and experts 
typically have to appear in simultaneous trials. A reasonable co-
operation between the presiding judge and defense counsels is 
therefore desirable, however not always ensured with Konfliktver-
teidigern
  
49. This is unfortunate, since the State Courts of Appeals 
and the BGH trend towards requiring such cooperation.50
4.  Ever Increasing Complexity of German Criminal Procedure 
Law, in particular its Law of Evidence, by a Net of BGH and 
BVerfG Decisions Becoming Constantly More Close-Meshed 
 
a) Germany is part of the continental European legal system (Civil 
Law system) in contrast to the Common Law system. Hence, one 
could assume that the legal regulation of criminal proceedings was 
primarily carried out by statute law, more precisely by the German 
Criminal Procedure Code (StPO) and Judicature Act (Gerichtsver-
fassungsgesetz, GVG). However, the law in action in Germany is 
quite different: 
                                      
48  Yet, § 229 subs. 2-4 StPO allows for longer periods of interruption in a lim-
ited number of enumerated cases. 
49  See supra Part One, II., 2., b), Fourthly with footnote 23. 
50  Apparently in this direction with references to case law: Hellmann, (supra 
note 3), side note 617; Tolksdorf in: KK (supra note 17), § 213 side notes  
4-4 b; intermediary: Krey, Deutsches Strafverfahrensrecht, Vol. 1 (supra 
note 3), side note 299 with footnote 200; Meyer-Goßner (supra note 3), 
§ 213 side note 6. 
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Indeed, the StPO as comprehensive codification, supplemented by 
the GVG, forms the core of German criminal procedure law. Nev-
ertheless, in today’s legal reality, criminal proceedings are predo-
minantly regulated by case law. Since the founding of the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1949, BGH, State Courts of Appeals and 
ultimately the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) have severely 
restricted the trial courts’ scope of decision-making by a net of 
precedents becoming constantly more close-meshed, overly 
complex and covering nearly every imaginable question of detail. 
This particularly holds for the law of evidence. Therefore Kühne 
rightly names “the increasing complexity ... caused by ever stricter 
procedural requirements on evidence taking and weighing”51
The mentioned “constriction of trial courts” by the German final 
appeal courts, additionally by the BVerfG, is unique in the world 
and in the end unreasonable, counterproductive as well as demo-
tivating for the trial court judges. Moreover, their situation is further 
aggravated by the fact that the BGH’s case law is to a large extent 
neither consistent nor free from surprising changes. 
 as an 
important reason for the trial courts’ overloading. Such view is 
shared by most trial judges and corresponds to the impression the 
co-author Krey has gained during his 20 years as judge at the 
State Court of Appeals (Oberlandesgericht Koblenz).  
Example:  
The BGH’s case law regarding whether or not the examination of 
witnesses in the main trial is admissible even though they are pro-
tected by optical and acoustical shielding (mummery and distor-
tion of voice) – in the past answering in the negative the Court’s 
Joint Panel in Criminal Cases (GS), yet new Court decisions ans-
wering in the positive in context with simultaneous audio-visual 
transmission of a witness’s testimony from another place into the 
courtroom under § 247 a StPO –52
                                      
51  Kühne (supra note 2), 822 and 828. 
, as well as regarding whether 
or not such interrogation by way of simultaneous audio-visual 
transmission takes priority over maintaining the secrecy of the wit-
ness’ identity in criminal proceedings under § 110 b subs. 3 s. 3 
StPO. 
52  See on the one hand BGH St 32, 115, 124 (GS), on the other hand: BGH 
NJW 2003, 74; BGH NStZ 2005, 43. 
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Such audio-visual presentation of witnesses “without face und 
voice” at court instead of maintaining the secrecy of their identity in 
the main trial is nowadays accepted by some decisions of the 
BGH53, however, stated as questionable by other Court’s deci-
sions due to lack of sufficient protection of endangered undercover 
agents (Verdeckter Ermittler) respectively police informers (Ver-
trauenspersonen der Polizei).54
The witness’ examination under visual and acoustical shielding is 
questionable due to the following reasons:
 
55
–  Firstly, the aspect of the witness’ human dignity as well as the 
court’s dignity. 
 
–  Secondly, the fact that such method of interrogation rather 
pretends than guarantees the possibility for the defendant 
and/or his counsel to confront the prosecution witness. 
–  Thirdly, the oftentimes insufficient protection from unmasking 
in spite of mummery and distortion of voice. 
Hence, the courts ought to refrain from such an “audio-visual 
masquerade”, or at least not abuse it as substitute for maintaining 
the secrecy of a seriously endangered witness’ identity in the main 
trial. 
Anyhow, the BGH has caused new trouble for trial judges, espe-
cially at the Higher District Courts. Such troubles are difficult to 
solve due to the inconsistency between the BGH’s newer deci-
sions and its above-mentioned prior decision by the Joint Panel in 
Criminal Cases (GS), as well as due to the contradictoriness be-
tween different panels of the Court. 
b) The aforesaid constriction of trial courts by the German final 
appeal courts is further aggravated by the BVerfG’s sweeping 
case law, primarily consisting of rulings of the Court’s chambers: 
                                      
53  BGH NStZ 2005, 43. 
54  BGH NStZ 2004, 345 et seq. – The BVerfG (infra note 55) acknowledges 
that danger in side note 23, 24. – 
55  Thereto: Krey, Deutsches Strafverfahrensrecht, Vol. 2 (supra note 1), side 
note 919 et seq., 923. 
 – Unfortunately, the BVerfG (chamber ruling decreeing the non-
acceptance of a constitutional complaint, dated 08 October 2009, case no. 
2 BvR 547/08) has accepted this “audio-visual masquerade” as not being 
unconstitutional. However, this ruling is neither binding (see supra, Part 
One, II., 3., a), (c), (1) with footnote 47), nor viably reasoned. – 
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Senates and particularly chambers of the BVerfG (supra note 1) 
have shaped the German criminal procedure law by an almost 
countless number of decisions, forming an additional close-
meshed net. This development has led to the phrase “criminal 
procedure law as applied constitutional law”.56
 
 It well describes the 
BVerfG’s practice, but at the same time illustrates a highly ques-
tionable aberration of the Court’s function from the German Fed-
eral Constitutional Court to a de facto super-appellate court in 
criminal matters. 
Example: 
The BVerfG’s decisions regarding the stand-by duty of trial court 
judges in preliminary proceedings in case of search and seizure 
measures, arrest warrants, and other serious procedural interfe-
rence with civil rights. Those, by now nearly innumerable, deci-
sions were enacted in order to protect the requirement of a court 
order (reservation of judicial authority) for such interference 
against erosion via extensive recourse to public prosecution’s and 
police’s subsidiary powers in exigent circumstances.57
Prior to instancing these issues, the content of such stand-by duty 
and its extension of the judges’ concerned workload shall initially 
be explained: 
 The respec-
tive case law of the BVerfG has been established since the begin-
ning of the new century, and from that time on has caused nu-
merous new legal issues, the solving of which is a problem for 
the trial courts. 
During the last decades of the 20th century, there only existed a 
stand-by duty for judges at lower district courts solely regarding 
arrest warrants, and restricted to weekends and public holidays 
during midday. This lack of a more comprehensive stand-by ser-
                                      
56  So e.g.: BVerfG E 32, 373, 383; BGH St 19, 325, 330; both with further 
references. Criticism by Krey, German Criminal Procedure Law (supra 
note 1), side note 28. 
57  BVerfG E 103, 142 et seq.; E 105, 239; both being decisions of the Court’s 
Second Senate. For references to the innumerous further Court decisions 
(chamber rulings) see Trück, JZ 2010, 1106 et seq. (footnote 16 et pas-
sim). – As to such subsidiary powers in exigent circumstances see infra 
note 58. – 
The Untenable Situation of German Criminal Law 
 25 
vice at the trial courts led to an overextensive use of subsidiary 
powers by public prosecution (and police).58
To counter that undesirable development, the BVerfG has created 
a duty to establish an additional, much wider-ranging stand-by 
service beyond the jugdes’ regular working hours, covering all 
working days, weekends as well as public holidays.
 
59 The trial 
courts for civil and criminal cases have been burdened with this 
duty, causing a further extension of their workload.60
The latter may be explained by presenting the stand-by duty’s 
scope within the Higher District Court Trier’s circuit, being typical 
for German trial courts: 
 
The judges at every Lower District Court (Amtsgericht, AG) within 
the mentioned circuit, excepting the Lower District Court Trier61
                                      
58  The mentioned phrase “susidiary powers in exigent circumstances” means 
the public prosecution’s (and oftentimes also the police’s) power to order 
interference with civil rights like seizure in preliminary proceedings instead 
of waiting for a court order which is in principle being required by law. 
Such subsidiary powers are laid down in numerous provisions of the StPO 
(supra note 11), e.g.: 
, 
and the judges at the Higher District Court (Landgericht, LG) are 
 – § 98 subs. 1 s. 1 StPO (order of seizure). 
 – § 105 subs. 1 s. 1 StPO with Art. 13 subs. 2 GG (order of house search). 
 In this context, the following formulation of the law is usual: The respective 
measure “may be ordered only by the court and, in exigent circumstances, 
by the public prosecution’s office . . .” 
 
 However, there exist some corresponding regulations conform in content 
but different in wording, e.g. § 81 a subs. 2 StPO (physical examination; 
blood test) which reads: “The authority to give such order shall be vested 
in the judge and, if a delay would endanger the success of the examina-
tion, also in the public prosecution office including the officials assisting it 
(§ 152 of the Federal Judicature Act).” 
59  BVerfG E 103, 142; E 105, 239; Meyer-Goßner (supra note 3), § 22 c 
GVG side note 2, 3. 
60  Convincing inter alia: Herrmann, Deutsche Richterzeitung (DRiZ, i.e. a 
German law journal), 2004, 319, 321; Rabe von Kühlewein, Juristische 
Rundschau (JR, i.e. a German law journal), 2007, 516, 519; Bundestag 
printed paper (BT-Drs.) 14/9166; disagreeing: Krehl, Zeitschrift für Wirt-
schafts- und Steuerstrafrecht (wistra, i.e. a German law journal), 2002, 
294, 296 (his optimistic outlook has been refuted by legal reality). 
61  This is because the AG Trier has to carry out the still existing, afore-
mentioned stand-by duty on weekends and public holidays during mid-
day. 
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saddled with the stand-by duty, each judge concerned for one 
week per year during the following hours: 
Monday until Friday from 6 to 8 AM, and Monday until Thursday 
from 5 to 9 PM, as well as Friday from 1 to 9 PM, additionally on 
weekends and public holidays from 6 AM to 9 PM.62
This additional burden was imposed without any compensation, 
e.g. day release. 
 
Due to the BVerfG establishing such comprehensive stand-by ser-
vice, particularly the following legal issues have arisen: 
–  Firstly, the question of equal treatment between statutory res-
ervations of judicial authority without constitutional rank (e.g. 
§ 81 a subs. 2 and § 163 f subs. 3 StPO63) on the one hand, 
and reservations of judicial authority explicitly laid down in the 
German Federal Constitution (e.g. Art. 13 subs. 2, subs. 3-5, 
Art. 104 subs. 2 GG64) on the other hand. The BVerfG’s case 
law on this question is rather inconsistent.65
 
 
In the meantime, Tolksdorf, President of the BGH, has plausibly 
declared the stand-by duty in case of solely trivial measures in 
                                      
62  In Festschrift for Achenbach (supra note 1), the authors unfortunately de-
scribed this additional stand-by duty on weekends and public holidays as 
lasting from 8 AM (instead of 6 AM) to 9 PM due to a typing error. 
63  Concerning physical examination/blood test, § 81 a, and longer-term ob-
servation, § 163 f StPO. 
64  Regarding the Inviolability of the Home, more precisely: house searches, 
Art. 13 subs. 2, as well as electronic surveillance of private homes (“bug-
ging operations”), Art. 13 subs. 3-5, and Deprivation of Liberty, Art. 104 
subs. 2 GG. 
 – Whether, and if so in which cases, there are reservations of judicial au-
thority with constitutional rank despite lack of expressive regulation in 
the German Federal Constitution (GG) shall not be discussed here. Never-
theless, it should be emphasized that the BVerfG accepts such unwritten 
constitutional reservations where the respective interference with civil 
rights is very serious (so inter alia BVerfG chamber ruling dated 
24 February 2011, case no. 2 BvR 1596/10 and 2 BvR 2346/10, in its side 
note 17). – 
65  In principle including even cases of simple blood tests within the scope of 
the stand-by duty: BVerfG chamber ruling, NJW 2007, 1345, 1346; further 
references in Meyer-Goßner (see supra note 3), § 105 side note 2, 3, 
§ 81 a side note 25 a, 25 b, and Trück (supra note 57), 1108. More restric-
tive lately BVerfG, chamber ruling, supra note 64, emphasizing that the 
reservation of judicial authority in § 81 a StPO has no constitutional rank. 
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preliminary proceedings like blood tests as unnecessary from a 
factual and a legal standpoint.66 Insofar, the reservation of judicial 
authority should be abolished. Corresponding in content, the Ger-
man State of Lower Saxony has introduced a draft bill67
–  Secondly, the problem whether, and if so to what extent, the 
stand-by judge’s order by telephone instead of a written ruling 
may be sufficient.
 in order to 
limit the detriments caused by an overexpansion of the mentioned 
stand-by duty. 
68
–  Thirdly, the issue whether or not a hearing of the person con-
cerned has to be carried out in the presence of the judge.
 
69
–  Fourthly, the question whether or not a 24 hour stand-by duty 
is demanded by law.
 
70
How far the daily stand-by duty at the trial courts should be ex-
tended, regarding its time frame as well as its applicability on res-
ervations of judicial authority without constitutional rank, shall not 
be decided here. Yet, some remarks may be allowed: 
 
–  The relevant Senate decisions of the BVerfG71
                                      
66  Spiegel Online dated 05 February 2010, <http://www.spiegel.de/auto/ 
aktuell/0,1518,676185,00.html>. 
 are only con-
cerned with reservations of judicial authority expressively laid 
down in the German Federal Constitution (Art. 13 subs. 2, 
67  Bundesrat printed paper (BR-Drs.) 615/10; 615/1/10. In the meantime ac-
cepted by the Bundesrat and passed on to the Bundestag, see 615/10(B). 
68  In principle allowing orders by telephone e.g.: BGH St 51, 285, 295; 
BVerfG (chamber) dated 23 July 2007, case no. 2 BvR 2267/06, side 
note 4 (juris); Meyer-Goßner (supra note 65) and Trück (supra note 65), 
1108-1115, both with further references. 
69  The judicial practice is inconsistent. However, the authors agree with the 
legal standpoint that at least in case of ordering preventive detention 
against mentally ill persons due to their dangerousness for themselves 
and/or third persons, a judge’s personal interrogation is necessary. 
70  Answering in the positive e.g.: OLG Hamm (3. Strafsenat, i.e. the Third 
Panel in Criminal Cases), NJW 2009, 3109, even in case of § 81 a StPO, 
blood test; Meyer-Goßner (supra note 3), § 105 side note 2 with further 
references. Answering in the negative e.g.: OLG Hamm (4. Strafsenat), 
case no. 4 Ss 316/09 and other panels of the court. Vague: BVerfG 
(chamber) NJW 2004, 1442; left undecided: BVerfG (chamber) dated 24 
February 2011 (supra note 64); rightly, the Senate decisions (supra 
note 57) did not demand for a 24 hour stand-by duty. 
71  See supra note 57. 
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Art. 104 subs. 2 GG72
–  Such rulings and decisions are insofar inadequate and unrea-
sonable as they, de facto, bluntly express: Ordering criminal 
procedural interferences with civil rights by the public prose-
cution (and all the more the police) is undesired. This stand-
point seems to be somewhat one-sided, at least in case of 
reservations of judicial authority without constitutional rank, 
because it contradicts the German public prosecution’s role 
as “master of the preliminary proceedings” and as “guardian 
of the law”
). This fact alone illustrates that the ex-
tensive application of stand-by duties regarding reservations 
of judicial authority without any constitutional rank by chamber 
rulings of the Court and by State Courts of Appeals decisions 
is questionable. 
73
 
. 
–  A 24 hour stand-by service for trial judges is at best adequate 
and reasonable where reservations of judicial authority with 
constitutional rank are concerned. 
c) The demonstrated close-meshed net of judicial control over the 
trial courts by the final courts of appeals and the BVerfG, criticized 
by the authors, is globally unique. It results in unnecessary work 
for trial judges, has a demotivating effect and contradicts the con-
stitutional principle of speedy trial. 
This is reflected in the number of appeals on law in criminal mat-
ters filed at the BGH (nearly 4,000 cases per year), as well as the 
number of constitutional complaints filed before the BVerfG (more 
than 6,000 per year, predominantly in matters of criminal justice): 
Both Courts’ inappropriately extensive supervision, covering 
nearly every imaginable question of detail, virtually provokes the 
filing of those legal remedies. 
From a comparative law perspective, such intensity of supervision 
is in any case grotesque: In comparison, the Supreme Court of the 
United States, despite being the Federal Supreme Court of Justice 
and at the same time Federal Constitutional Court, hears less than 
100 cases per year, covering not only criminal matters. The multi-
tude of appeals to the twelve US Federal Courts of Appeals are no 
                                      
72  See supra note 64. 
73  Thereto: Krey (supra note 10); Krey, German Criminal Procedure Law 
(supra note 1), side note 143-145, 154, 166-172. 
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counter-argument, since the authors do not even refer to the near-
ly innumerable appeals on law to the German State Courts of Ap-
peals (Oberlandesgerichte, OLG); not to mention the fact, that 
even German State Constitutional Courts concern themselves with 
criminal cases.74
Admittedly, it shall be conceded that the mentioned US legal situa-
tion is a counter extreme to German law. However, the intensity of 
supervision by final appeal courts and constitutional courts in other 
Western countries is also far from the situation in Germany. 
  
III. Consequences of the Trial Courts’ Mentioned Overloading 
Here, some short remarks shall be sufficient: 
1.  The German States, under public law employers of the State 
judges, violate their duty of care as also owed to trial judges. 
2.  This overloading necessarily leads to considerable delays in 
criminal proceedings and/or to loss of quality in the trial 
courts’ completion of criminal cases. Of late, the former may 
result in detriments for the respective trial judges: Where 
OLG or BVerfG has reprimanded a trial court for violations of 
§ 121 subs. 1 StPO75, increasingly the respective State minis-
try of justice initiates disciplinary measures of supervision 
(e.g. censure) against the judge concerned, even if the reason 
for that violation lay in the judge’s serious overloading. Such a 
reaction may be more convenient than creating new trial 
judge positions.76
                                      
74  For instance see the Honecker case, Constitutional Court of the State of 
Berlin (BerlVerfGH) NJW 1993, 515 et seq.; thereto inter alia Krey, Ger-
man Criminal Procedure Law (supra note 1), side note 31, 32 with further 
references. 
 
75  See above Part One, II., 2. b). 
76  Some decades ago, State ministries of justice (e.g. in Rhineland-
Palatinate) created new judge positions in cases where the State Courts of 
Appeals had to set free remand prisoners under § 122 StPO and in that 
context had emphasized the trial courts’ permanent overload. This was 
back when co-author Krey was judge at the State Court of Appeals 
Koblenz. At that time, nobody would even have imagined that State minis-
tries of Justice would intimidate overloaded trial judges by disciplinary 
measures of supervision instead of unburdening them. 
Volker Krey and Oliver Windgätter 
30 
3.  Where the trial judges’ overload does not allow for speedy as 
well as thorough completion of criminal trials, the indepen-
dence of judges is endangered.77
4.  Since decades, there is an increasing “escape into the deal” 
(Flucht in die Absprache) in German criminal trials as re-
sponse to such overload. Despite heavy criticism of this de-
velopment, in the meantime even the legislator has accepted 
it by enacting a legal regulation of the so called Absprachen in 
Strafsachen (deal in criminal proceedings) by amending the 
German Criminal Procedure Code (StPO) in 2009.
 
78
Before and after this expressive acceptance by law, the deal in 
criminal proceedings was severely criticized by many legal scho-
lars
 
79
In contrast, the authors consider the deal to be acceptable in its 
core.
, and even by some judges of the BGH. 
80 Insofar, only some short remarks shall be presented,81
–  BVerfG and BGH, even its Joint Panel in Criminal Cases 
(GS), have accepted the deal for a long time.
 
since a thorough reasoning would demand for an own paper: 
82
–  The necessity to reduce the trial judges’ overload by informal 
agreements (deals) is widely accepted. 
 
–  An unreserved and comprehensive confession at an early 
stage has always been recognized as a legitimate ground for 
mitigation of punishment as long as such mitigation is not dis-
proportionate. 
                                      
77  See the convincing as well as blistering criticism by Heribert Prantl, Süd-
deutsche Zeitung (i.e. a German daily newspaper) dated 10/11 December 
2005; likewise: Krey (supra note 74), side note 66; Kühne (see supra 
note 26), side note 110. 
78  See §§ 257 c, 273 subs. 1 a s. 2 StPO. 
79  Critically inter alia: Altenhain/Hainerl, JZ 2010, 327 et seq.; extremely 
harsh criticism by Hettinger, JZ 2011, 292 et seq.; Kühne (supra note 2), 
824, 825; Meyer-Goßner (supra note 3), § 257 c side note 3; Roxin/ 
Schünemannn (supra note 3), 44/64, 65 with 17/19 et seq. Regarding the 
statutory regulation of the deal (supra note 78) see in detail inter alia: 
Beulke (supra note 3), side note 394-396 with further references. 
80  Likewise inter alia Kudlich (supra note 1), C 65. By the way, most German 
defense counsels favour the deal. 
81  See in detail Krey, Deutsches Strafverfahrensrecht, Vol. 2 (supra note 1), 
side note 776, 987, 1040-1055 with further references. 
82  BVerfG (chamber ruling), NStZ 1987, 420; BGH St 50, 40 ff (GS). 
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–  Deals do serve the principle of speedy trial. 
 –  Furthermore, they serve the protection of witnesses. 
As to opposing arguments typically being presented by legal scho-
lars fighting the deal, the authors refer to earlier reasoning of co-
author Krey.83
PART TWO: Qualitative Overcharging 
 
This term refers to the burden of judges at the trial courts, Amtsge-
richte and Landgerichte, particularly of criminal judges, that is un-
connected with their genuine subject. More precisely, it refers to 
cases which by their very nature should fall into the jurisdiction of 
another court, be it an administrative court, be it a civil law court. 
I.  Considerable Burdening with Matters of Police Law  
(Averting of Dangers) 
Surprisingly, under the German State Police Acts the requirement 
of a court order in case of police interference with civil rights (Rich-
tervorbehalt) is not entrusted to the administrative courts. Rather, 
despite the cases concerned being police law by their nature 
(averting of dangers) they are entrusted to the trial courts for civil 
and criminal law.84
In the State of Rhineland-Palatinate, this avoidance of the admin-
istrative courts’ general jurisdiction in matters of police law has 
been enacted by the State Police Act (Polizei- und Ordnungs-
behördengesetz, POG)
  
85
–  Checking in order to verify a person’s identity, § 10 subs. 2 
s. 3 with § 15 POG. 
 for the following preventive police meas-
ures: 
–  Enforcement of a summons by force, § 12 subs. 3 with § 15 
POG. 
                                      
83  See Krey (supra note 81), side note 1040 et seq. 
84  This by application of the exception rule in § 40 subs. 1 s. 2 Verwaltungs-
gerichtsordnung (VwGO, i.e. Administrative Courts Act). 
85 Dated 10 November 1993, last amended by act of 25 July 2005 (State Law 
Gazette p. 320). Also published in: Hufen/Jutzi/Westenberger, Landes-
recht Rheinland-Pfalz, 19th ed., 2010, no. 40. 
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–  Preventive police detention (in order to avert concrete dan-
gers), § 14 with § 15 POG.  
–  Molecular-genetic analysis, § 11 a subs. 3 POG. 
–  Search of homes, § 21 subs. 1 POG. 
–  Special means of secret data acquisition, e.g. use of under-
cover agents (Verdeckte Ermittler), police informers, secret 
use of technical means for recording pictures and conversa-
tions, and electronic surveillance, § 28 subs. 5 s. 4 POG. 
–  Data acquisition by secret use of technical means against 
homes („bugging operation“), § 29 subs. 7 POG. 
In this context, the jurisdiction lies with the Amtsgericht, usually 
exercised by the investigating judge/examining magistrate (Er-
mittlungsrichter), beyond the judges’ regular working hours by the 
respective stand-by judge.86
Here, the question suggests itself: Why are criminal judges (and in 
case of stand-by duty even civil judges) entrusted with such mat-
ters of police law in spite of their nature as administrative law and 
the existence of a comprehensive system of administrative courts? 
 
Questions of professional competence presumably might not be 
playing a decisive role for this avoidance. The more obvious ques-
tion, which courts in principle decide more speedily, shall not be 
discussed here. Rather, the mentioned avoidance of administra-
tive courts simply may result from the existence of an established 
and, despite all overloading, functioning stand-by duty at the Low-
er and the Higher District Courts – which reflects a widespread 
principle in public service: “He, who completes his duties speedily, 
shall receive more duties.” 
II. Extension of the “Adhäsionsverfahren”87
The expansion of the victims’ criminal procedural rights since 1986 
is an expression of the zeitgeist, and in principle to be welcomed. 
However, the recently (2004) enacted overexpansion of the 
 Intended by the  
Legislator as an Additional Burden on Criminal Judges 
                                      
86  §§ 11 a subs. 3; 15 subs. 2; 21 subs. 1; 28 subs. 5 s. 5; 29 subs. 10 POG. 
– Regarding the stand-by duty see above, Part One, II, 4, b). 
87  See supra note 4. 
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Adhäsionsverfahren in the German Criminal Procedure Code 
(StPO)88
Krey and Wilhelmi have emphasized in detail and with comments 
on legal history as well as comparative law that this overexpansion 
simply means “being on the wrong track”.
 is inappropriate: 
89
PART THREE: The Overexpansion of Criminal Justice 
 This is for the following 
reason: A strict enforcement of the 2004 amended Adhäsionsver-
fahren would burden the criminal judges severely with additional 
matters not sufficiently connected with criminal law. Fortunately, 
the criminal courts’ practice mostly has abstained from applying 
this overexpanded instrument until this day. 
I. Constant Expansion of Criminal Law against its Nature as  
ultima ratio 
As already mentioned initially, legal scholars like Kudlich and 
Kühne name the constant extension of criminal law by incessantly 
enacting new criminal offences as an important reason for the 
criminal courts’ overloading.90 This expansion particularly takes 
place in the field of supplementary criminal law (meaning crimi-
nal law regulated outside the Criminal Code)91
–  The flood of blanket statutes in the field of criminal law which 
refer to EU Ordinances, e.g. in wine law, and often are hardly 
comprehensible due to strings of references (Verweisungs-
ketten) to other EU Ordinances.
; to exemplify the 
latter the authors refer to the following facts: 
92 Here, additional problems 
arise when the object of reference is being substituted.93
                                      
88  See supra note 5. 
 
89  See supra, Introduction with footnote 5. 
90  See supra note 7. 
91  Thereto in detail: Kühne, Das Nebenstrafrecht der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Seoul 2008, Korean Institute of Criminology (bilingual). 
92  Hecker, Europäisches Strafrecht, 3rd ed., 2010, 7/76-104 with further refe-
rences; Krey, Zur Verweisung auf EWG-Verordnungen in Blankett-
strafgesetzen..., in: EWR, Schriftenreihe zum europäischen Weinrecht, 
1981, p. 109-201; Moll, Europäisches Strafrecht durch nationale 
Blankettstrafgesetzgebung, 1998. 
93  Hecker (supra note 92), 7/88-92. 
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–  The ever increasing extension of criminal offences’ scope by 
including cases of committing negligently, covering even slight 
negligence, whereas the requirement of intent still dominates 
in the Special Part of the German Criminal Code (StGB).  
But even in the so called „Kernstrafrecht“ (i.e. the mentioned 
Special Part of the StGB) a massive expansion occurs, e.g. by in-
cluding gross negligent/reckless forms of committing offences 
against property (§§ 261 subs. 5, 264 subs. 4 StGB), furthermore 
by increasing inclusion of any form of negligence (in particular in 
environmental criminal law). Finally, there is an incremental num-
ber of criminal offences the necessity of which is not obvious from 
a criminal policy standpoint (e.g. § 265 b StGB, Obtaining Credit 
by Deception).94
The aforesaid development contradicts an unwritten constitutional 
principle expressed in the term “subsidiary nature of criminal law” 
(ultima ratio).
 
95
This undesirable development is complemented by another one: 
There is an increasing number of criminal offences like § 261 
StGB (Money Laundering), being almost incomprehensible due to 
their unbelievable extensiveness and complexity. 
 
II.  Growing Complexity of Criminal Procedure Law because of 
Permanent Amendments 
The latter insight concerning criminal law leads to a concluding 
remark on an additional nuisance giving criminal trial court judges 
“a hard time”: The increasing complexity also of the criminal pro-
cedure law by permanent amendments96
–  Today’s version of § 68 StPO as amended by the Gesetz zur 
Bekämpfung ... der Organisierten Kriminalität (OrgKG, i.e. Act 
on Fighting Organized Crime of 1992), which partially has left 
, oftentimes insufficiently 
thought-out. In this context the following examples may be given: 
                                      
94  See for instance Fischer, StGB, 57th ed. 2010, § 265 b side note 4, 5 with 
further references: This criminal offence was unnecessary. 
95  Regarding the Criminal Law as ultima ratio among the instruments of the 
legislator see e.g.: Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil/German 
Criminal Law, General Part, Textbook in German and English, Vol. 1, 2002 
side note 1 et seq., 16 et seq., 28. 
96  See Kühne in: LR (supra note 13), Einl. F, side note 151-163. 
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open previous controversies, furthermore has de facto made 
possible the unmasking of endangered witnesses (particularly 
of undercover agents and police informers).97
–  § 247 StPO (removal of the defendant from the courtroom, 
e.g. due to serious endangerment of witnesses), the applica-
tion of which often leads to successful appeals on law, since 
in context with the hearing of the respective witness during 
the defendant’s absence other evidence taking has been car-
ried out at the same time.
 
98
–  The already mentioned § 247 a StPO (simultaneous audio-
visual transmission of a witness’ testimony from another place 
into the courtroom).
 
99
                                      
97  Thereto in detail: Krey, Deutsches Strafverfahrensrecht, Vol. 2 (supra  
note 1), side note 913. 
 
98  See: Meyer-Goßner (supra note 3), § 247 side note 7, 20 b. 
99  See supra, Part One, II, 4 a (with footnote 52-54). 
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APPENDIX 
INTERNET SOURCES ON  
RELEVANT GERMAN CODIFICATIONS 
ENGLISH VERSIONS 
 
 
 
I.  Grundgesetz (GG) – German Federal Constitution 
 (Basic Law) 
 
 http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html 
 
 
II.  Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (GVG) – Judicature Act 
 
 http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gvg/index.html 
 
 
III.  Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) – Criminal Code 
 
 http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/index.html 
 
 
IV.  Strafprozessordnung (StPO) – Criminal Procedure Code 
 
 http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/index.html 
 
 
V.  Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung (VwGO) –  
 Administrative Courts Act 
 
 http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_vwgo/index.html 
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